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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NORMA HOWARD, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 940010CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over appeals from circuit courts is 
conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals by Section 78-20-
3(2)(d), Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Standard of Review as to All Issues 
All of the issues were decided within the context of the 
granting of a motion for summary judgment. This court stated 
the applicable standard of review in Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 
P.2d 281, 283 (1987), thusly: 
On reviewing a summary judgment, an 
appellate court applies the same standard 
as that applied by the trial court. 
Durham v. Maraetts. 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 
(Utah 1977). lf[W]e consider the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the losing 
party, and affirm only where it appears 
there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material issues of fact, or where, even 
l 
according to the facts as contended by 
the losing party, the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc.. 595 
P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979). 
Issues on Appeal 
1. Whether the subject automobile was "used . . . in 
any manner to facilitate . . . simple possession . . . of a 
controlled substance" and therefore was subject to forfeiture 
under Section 58-37-13, Utah Code, because a driver happens 
to have marijuana in his pocket while moving the automobile 
out of the way of his own vehicle. 
2. Whether the appellant was an "owner" of the 
automobile within the meaning of Section 58-37-13(1) (e) (ii) , 
Utah Code, such that her lack of knowledge of and consent to 
the illegal use by a nominal joint owner would preclude 
forfeiture under that section. 
3. Whether forfeiture is precluded because of 
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of 
Utah because: 
a) There was no record of the purported warrant that 
was claimed to justify the detention and search of the driver 
and the initial seizure of appellant's automobile. 
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b) The vehicle was seized without prior process 
specifying the automobile and there were no exigent 
circumstances which justified a seizure without obtaining 
prior process. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Section 58-37-13, Utah Code, provides in pertinent part: 
Property subject to forfeiture - Seizure 
- Procedure 
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture and no 
property right exists in them: 
• • • • 
(e) all conveyances including 
aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or 
intended for use, to transport, or in any 
manner facilitate the transportation, 
sale, receipt, simple possession, or 
concealment of property described in 
Subsection (1)(a) and (1)(b), except 
that: 
(ii) a conveyance may not be 
forfeited under this section by reason of 
any act or omission committed or omitted 
without the owner's knowledge or consent, 
and 
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance 
subject to a bona fide security interest 
is subject to the interest of a secured 
party who could not have known in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence that a 
violation would or did take place in the 
3 
use of the conveyance. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah is 
substantively identical to the Fourth Amendment, supra, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(a) Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of an order of the Third Circuit Court 
granting summary judgment for the respondent/appellee State 
and denying the petitioner/appellant's cross motion for 
summary judgment on a petition for the return of an 
automobile seized for forfeiture pursuant to Section 58-37-
13, Utah Code. (The Controlled Substance Act). 
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(b) Course of the Proceedings 
The appellant, pursuant to Section 58-37-13(9)(e), Utah 
Code, brought a Verified Petition for Release of Property 
seeking the return of the property, including the subject 
automobile, seized in a drug raid. (R-l) • The State 
released some of the property but filed an Answer (R-44) 
seeking the forfeiture of the automobile and at the same time 
filed a motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum 
(R-50) and affidavit. (R-56). The appellant responded with a 
cross motion for summary judgment (R-60) and supporting 
memorandum (R-61) and affidavits. (R-72-81). 
(c) Disposition in Circuit Court 
After oral argument, the circuit court issued an order 
on December 13, 1993, granting the State's motion and denying 
the appellant's cross motion for summary judgment. 
(Appendix; R-97). The appellant filed a notice of appeal to 
this court on January 10, 1994. 
(d) Statement of Facts 
The underlying facts were not in dispute. The subject 
property was an automobile ("the Mustang") which had been 
given to the petitioner/appellant, Norma Howard, ("the 
5 
wife"). (R-73,76,79). The automobile was registered by her 
husband, Leon Howard, to "Leon (or) Norma Howard." (R-57) . 
Both the wife and her husband regarded the Mustang as the 
sole property of the wife (R-77, 80) and the wife had 
requested that Legal Services obtain an award of the Mustang 
in a divorce that Legal Services was to seek for her. (R-
80) . The husband has his own vehicle and did not drive the 
Mustang without the express permission of the wife and had 
done so only on rare occasion. (R-77). 
On the date of the seizure, the wife had parked the 
subject automobile behind her husband's truck blocking it in 
the driveway of their home. (R-77, 80-81). When the husband 
went to leave, the wife told him to move her Mustang himself 
so he could get his own truck out of the driveway because she 
was busy. Ibid. As the husband was moving the Mustang 
within the driveway, he was blocked by a police car, detained 
and searched by police officers (R-77) who were acting under 
the color of a purported search warrant for his person and 
the residence. (R-56-57). A small quantity of marijuana, 
which the husband had forgotten, was found in the pocket of 
his pants and he was arrested. (R-57-77). There is nothing 
in the record indicating that any contraband was located in 
the Mustang. 
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The automobile was seized for forfeiture "incident to 
the arrest of the husband." (R-57). The purported search 
warrant for the residence and the person of the husband did 
not specify the automobile.1 No process for the seizure of 
the Mustang was ever issued, nor did any magistrate or judge 
authorize the seizure until the order appealed here was 
issued over three months after the seizure. 
The alleged warrant, that was claimed to justify the 
detention and search of the husband as well as the residence, 
was purported to have been issued by the Third Circuit 
Court.2 However, there was no record of any such warrant for 
the husband or the residence in the Third Circuit Court. 
That is, not only was there no application and supporting 
affidavit and no return, but there was no indication that the 
court had ever issued such a warrant up to and including the 
time of submission of the cross motions for summary judgment 
at the end of November, 1993.3 
1A copy of the purported warrant that was left at the 
residence was attached to the Verified Petition (R-6). 
2See Note 1. 
3This negative fact is supported in the record by a 
statement in the Verified Petition, dated September 28, 1993 
(R-2); a representation in the Memorandum in Opposition that 
the clerk of the court had reported as of November 23, 1993, 
that there was nothing on file with regard to such a search 
warrant. (R-68). The State offered nothing to the contrary. 
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The husband admitted to possession of marijuana and pled 
guilty to that offense in the Circuit Court.4 The wife 
denied giving her husband permission to possess marijuana in 
her Mustang and denied that she had any knowledge of him 
doing so until after he was arrested. (R-80). Her permission 
as to the Mustang was limited to allowing her husband to move 
the automobile a few feet so that he could get his own truck 
out of the driveway. Ibid. The petitioner was aware that 
her husband used marijuana but had not approved of his 
keeping it in their house and had argued about that with him. 
(R-78,80). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: The Vehicle Was Not Subject to 
Forfeiture. 
The Mustang automobile was not subject to forfeiture 
because it was not put to a use which in any manner facilita-
ted the possession of marijuana. It was undisputed that the 
driver, who happened to have marijuana in his pocket, was 
moving the Mustang just so that he could leave in his own 
truck which was blocked in the driveway by the Mustang. That 
4State v. Leon Howard, Third Circuit Court, S.L. Dept., No. 
931012672 F.S., brought to the trial court's attention. (R-
63-64) . 
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use did not facilitate the possession of the contraband as 
the statute requires to subject the vehicle to forfeiture. 
Point II: As an Innocent Owner Appellant 
Was Entitled to the Return of Her 
Vehicle. 
The Utah statute provides that a vehicle may not be for-
feited by reason of an act committed without the owner's 
knowledge or consent and it was undisputed that the posses-
sion of marijuana was without the wife's knowledge and 
consent. 
A. The circuit court erroneously applied the federal 
constitutional due process test rather than the Utah statut-
ory test and erroneously required that the wife prove that 
the vehicle was moved without her consent or that she had 
done all she could to prevent the offense. 
B. The undisputed facts showed that the wife was the 
actual and equitable sole owner of the Mustang. The facts 
that the Mustang was registered in the alternative names of 
the husband and wife and that the Motor Vehicle Code provides 
that either joint owner can endorse the certificate of title 
and transfer ownership have no bearing on determining 
ownership under the forfeiture statute. 
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C. Even if the wife were considered a co-owner with 
the guilty husband, the statute protects an innocent co-
owner. The cases from other states interpreting similar 
statutes overwhelmingly hold that such statutes protect the 
innocent co-owner, either by precluding forfeiture altogether 
or protecting the innocent owner to the extent of her 
interest, and reject arguments attributing guilt or knowledge 
from the guilty to the innocent co-owner. 
D. The appropriate relief under the Utah statute is to 
preclude forfeiture altogether where there is an innocent co-
owner. Alternatively, if the Utah statute protects the 
innocent co-owner to the extent of her interest, the innocent 
wife's interest in this case is to the entire vehicle and she 
is entitled to its return. 
Point III: Forfeiture is Precluded by 
Constitutional and Statutory Violations 
in the Seizure. 
A. There was no record of the purported search 
warrant, that was the claimed justification for the initial 
seizure of the person of the husband and the wife's Mustang 
and the search which produced the contraband, in the court 
which allegedly issued that warrant. Such a failure to 
comply with the requirements for issuing a search warrant 
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deprives the warrant of presumed validity and renders the 
searches and seizures invalid and the evidence obtained 
inadmissable in a forfeiture matter. 
B. The circuit court lacked jurisdiction, even if the 
purported search warrant for the husband's person were valid, 
because the vehicle was seized without process specifying the 
Mustang and there were no exigent circumstances that would 
excuse the failure to get such a warrant. 
DETAILS OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO 
FORFEITURE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT USED TO 
FACILITATE THE POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA. 
The subject vehicle, the Mustang, was not put to a use 
which would bring it within the purview of the forfeiture 
statute, Section 58-37-13, Utah Code. That section provides 
in pertinent part: 
(1) The following are subject to 
forfeiture and no property right exists 
in them: 
(e) all conveyances . . . used or 
intended for use, to transport, or in any 
manner facilitate the transportation, 
sale, receipt, simple possession, or 
concealment of [controlled substances or 
paraphernalia for trafficking in con-* 
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trolled substances] . . . 
The court below held that, because the husband of 
appellant was in the car with marijuana in his pocket, the 
"car was used in a manner that facilitated the possession and 
is therefore subject to forfeiture." (R-97-98, Appendix i-
ii). 
Appellant contends that this is an erroneous interpreta-
tion and application of the statutory language to the 
undisputed facts. While the use of the modifying phrase, "in 
any manner" renders the scope of the verb "facilitate" broad 
indeed, the conveyance must none-the-less be shown to have 
been used in some manner to facilitate the possession of the 
contraband. Forfeiture provisions are not favored in the law 
and are strictly construed. Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 
548 P.2d 889, 891 (Utah 1976) (Contract law context); In re 
Forfeiture of One 1970 Ford, 823 P.2d 339, 341 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1991); One 1978 Chevrolet Van v. County of Churchill, 634 
P.2d 1208, 1209 (Nev. 1981). 
It was undisputed that the only, "use" to which appell-
ant's husband was putting the Mustang was to move it a few 
feet so that it was no longer blocking his own truck in the 
driveway. There was no nexus whatsoever between this "use" 
of the Mustang and the possession of the marijuana which just 
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happened to be stored unconsciously in the husband's pocket. 
The only nexus between the marijuana and the Mustang was that 
of proximity. While the Utah legislature could have provided 
for the forfeiture of any vehicle in which contraband was 
located, it chose not to do so. Compare the Utah Statute 
with Section 932.703, Florida Statutes (1985), quoted in 
State v. Crenshaw, 548 So.2d 223, 224-225 (Fla. 1989). 
The appellant is not arguing that the vehicle is not 
forfeitable simply because the contraband was in the hus-
band's pocket rather than found somewhere in the car. If the 
defendant had been using the Mustang to transport the 
marijuana to another location, for example, it would not make 
any difference that the marijuana was in the husband's pocket 
rather than on the seat beside him. State v. Pudzis, 507 
So.2d 531 (Ala. Cir. App. 1987). Appellant is contending 
that the husband's use of the Mustang in all the circumstan-
ces of this case did not facilitate his possession of 
marijuana in any way, not even serving as a holding recep-
tacle while he drove. 
The Utah statute requires that the use of the vehicle 
"facilitate" the possession (or other prohibited conduct). 
"Facilitate" means "to make easy or less difficult." 
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary. The Mustang was not being 
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used to make the husband's possession of marijuana "easy or 
less difficult." Certainly that possession would not have 
been made more difficult if the Mustang had not been parked 
where it was blocking his own vehicle and the husband had not 
had to move it. 
II. AS AN INNOCENT OWNER, APPELLANT WAS 
ENTITLED TO THE RETURN OF HER VEHICLE. 
The Utah forfeiture statute provides an express "in-
nocent owner" defense to forfeiture of vehicles in Section 
58-37-13(1)(e)(ii), Utah Code, as follows: 
a conveyance may not be forfeited 
under this section by reason of any act 
or omission committed or omitted without 
the owner's knowledge or consent. 
Despite the undisputed evidence that the wife did not 
have knowledge of or consent to her husband's possession of 
marijuana in the Mustang, the court below concluded that she 
was not entitled to the statutory protection. (R-98, 
Appendix ii). 
A. Federal case law does not modify the 
Utah statutory innocent owner defense. 
The court below, in its Order Granting Respondent's 
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Motion for Summary Judgment concluded: 
Further, even if Petitioner could 
assert an innocent owner's interest, she 
does not argue that the car was either 
moved without her consent or that she did 
what she reasonably could to prevent the 
illegal use of the car by the defendant. 
Under federal case law only these two 
circumstances would support her assertion 
against forfeiture. 
Ibid. Thus the circuit court, citing federal case law, added 
an additional requirement that is not required by the Utah 
statute to qualify an innocent owner to protection against 
forfeiture. While appellant also contends that she did do 
all that she reasonably could to prevent the illegal use, 
more importantly she contends that the circuit court erred in 
concluding that she had to meet either that requirement or 
show that the car was moved without her consent. 
The "federal case law" referred to originates with 
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. , 416 U.S. 663, 94 
S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed. 452 (1974), wherein the Supreme Court 
upheld a forfeiture under Puerto Rican law against a due 
process attack. The Puerto Rican forfeiture law, unlike the 
Utah statute, had no provision providing protection to 
innocent owners. In dicta, the court observed that, if an 
owner could show that the forfeited conveyance was taken 
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without his consent or that he had done all he could to 
prevent unlawful use, it would be difficult to reject a 
constitutional claim. 416 U.S. at 686, 94 S.Ct. at 2094. 
The Supreme Court, by suggesting the minimal standard for 
protection that is required by federal constitutional law 
did not mean to preclude a state from providing more protec-
tion to innocent owners in its state forfeiture statute. 
E.g., State v. One 1984 Toyota Truck, 533 A.2d 659, 665 (Md. 
1987). In re Forfeiture of $53.00, 444 N.W.2d 182, 186-187 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989). 
The United States Supreme Court has recently applied the 
innocent owner protection which now appears in the federal 
controlled substance law to preclude the forfeiture of a home 
purchased by the mistress of a drug dealer with funds that 
were a gift to her and traceable to a illegal drug transac-
tion. United States v. A Parcel of Land, U.S. , 113 
S.Ct. 1126 (1993). The Court held that proof of a lack of 
knowledge was all that the statute5 required and refused to 
read in to the statute an additional requirement that the 
5The federal drug law forfeiture provisions were amended in 
1978 to provide: lf[N]o property shall be forfeited under 
this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by 
reason of any act or omission established by that owner to 
have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or 
consent of that owner." 21 U.S.C. §881(a)(6). 
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protected owner be a bona fide purchaser for value, 113 S.Ct. 
at 1134, yet alone prove that she had done all she could to 
determine the source of the funds. 
Regardless of the state of federal law, the Utah 
legislature has chosen to protect owners where the unlawful 
act was committed "without the owner's knowledge or consent." 
The wife here asserted under oath that the husband's posses-
sion of marijuana in her car was without her knowledge or 
consent. Affidavit of Norma Howard (R-80 ) . That is all 
that the Utah stature requires. 
B. As the actual and equitable sole 
owner, the innocent wife was entitled to 
return of the vehicle. 
The court below observed that: "Were the Petitioner the 
sole owner of the vehicle she could assert an innocent 
owner's interest with persuasiveness." However, the trial 
court went on to conclude that the wife was a joint owner 
with the guilty husband. Conclusion No. 2, Order Granting 
Summary Judgment (R-98, Appendix ii) . The only basis for 
that conclusion was the fact that the vehicle was registered 
to "Leon (or) Norma Howard." 
The wife asserted below that she was "the actual and 
equitable sole owner of the vehicle." Memorandum in Opposi— 
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tion, (R-65). The undisputed facts submitted in support of 
that assertion were set out in the Statement of Material 
Facts in the wife's Memorandum in Opposition (R-61-63) as 
follows: 
In the summer of 1991, the prior 
owner of the subject Mustang car, Tricia 
Tedford, was staying with petitioner. 
Her boyfriend, Ricky Knox, was arrested 
while driving the car and extradited to 
Arkansas. The car was impounded because 
the registration was expired among other 
problems. Tricia and her infant child 
continued to reside with petitioner for 
six months until she returned to Arkan-
sas. Tricia conveyed the Mustang car to 
Norma Howard in gratitude for her 
hospitality and because the storage 
charges were mounting and she could not 
afford to get the car out and had to 
return to Arkansas. (Affidavit of Tricia 
Tedford; Affidavit of Norma Howard) [R-
72-79]. 
The Mustang was registered in late 
1991 to Leon and/or Norma Howard because 
Leon Howard was a licensed driver and 
Norma was not. Leon Howard obtained a 
bill of sale from Tricia Tedford in a 
nominal amount to use in registering the 
vehicle. (Affidavit of Leon Howard) [R-
76] . 
At the end of 1992, Norma and Leon 
Howard began to experience problems with 
their marriage. Norma Howard consulted 
with Legal Aid in the summer of 1993 and 
got on a waiting list to receive legal 
services to get a divorce. She requested 
at that time that she be awarded the 
Mustang. Norma Howard uses the Mustang 
to transport herself and her four small 
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children on errands. (Affidavit of Norma 
Howard) [R-79]• 
Leon Howard agrees that the Mustang 
automobile was Norma's separate property. 
Leon has two trucks and an automobile 
registered in his sole name. One of the 
trucks is a "dressed up" blue Nissan 
which he uses as his personal transporta-
tion. Leon would not drive the Mustang 
away from the residence without the 
express permission of Norma. (Affidavit 
of Leon Howard) [R-76]. 
It is submitted that in view of the foregoing undisputed 
facts, the court below should have concluded that the wife 
was the sole "owner" within the meaning of the statute and, 
since the unlawful use of the Mustang was without her 
knowledge or consent, was entitled to its return. At the 
very least, the affidavits raised a factual dispute on the 
issue. 
The state in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R-52) asserted the applicability of Section 
41-la-702(2)(a) of the Utah Motor Vehicle Code, which 
provides: 
if a title certificate reflects the 
names of two or more people as co-
owners in the alternative by the use of 
the word "or" or "and/or", each co-owner 
is considered to have granted the other 
co-owners the absolute right to endorse 
and deliver title and to dispose of the 
vehicle. 
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No doubt, if the husband had endorsed and delivered the 
certificate of title, the transferee would be able to defeat 
a claim by the wife. However, this is not a dispute as to 
ownership under the Motor Vehicle Code but a question of 
statutory protection against forfeiture. 
In State v. One 1979 Pontiac Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), this court was faced with the applica-
tion of the closely analogous protection against forfeiture 
afforded to a holder of a bona fide security interest in the 
subsection immediately following the innocent owner subsec-
tion at issue here. This court affirmed the trial court's 
ruling protecting the unperfected security interest held by 
the guilty owner's grandparents against the forfeiture of a 
vehicle used to transport cocaine. The Motor Vehicle Code, 
in Section 41-la-601, requires a security interest to be 
perfected to be valid against creditors acquiring a lien or 
subsequent purchasers. The grandparents in One 1979 Pontiac 
Trans Am. supra, were held to be protected by subsection 
(1)(e)(iii) of Section 58-37-13, Utah Code, by showing they 
were holders of a "bona fide security interest" despite the 
fact that that interest was not perfected as the Motor 
Vehicle Code requires. Similarly, the wife here should be 
held protected by subsection (1)(e)(ii) of that same section 
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by showing she was the actual sole owner despite the fact 
that her husband's name was also on the registration and she 
might not have been able to assert a claim of ownership 
against a purchaser who had a certificate of title endorsed 
by the husband because of the Motor Vehicle Code. 
In determining the protection afforded an innocent co-
owner under a similarly worded statute, the Michigan Court of 
Appeals, stated: 
In particular, we reject the notion 
that the language of a title to a vehicle 
necessarily controls the rights of the 
owner under the Michigan forfeiture 
statute• 
In re Forfeiture of $53.00, 444 N.W.2d 182, 186 (1989). The 
Ohio Supreme Court also rejected the argument that ownership 
in forfeiture matters is conclusively established by the 
certificate of title and approved the protection of equitable 
ownership not of record, saying: 
Initially, we must conclude that the 
provisions of R.C. 4505.04 were designed 
to protect title as between true and 
fraudulent title claimants and to create 
an instrument evidencing title to and 
ownership of motor vehicles. (Citations 
omitted). We do not hold that the 
legislature intended for said section to 
be construed to effectively deprive 
equitable owners of their interest in a 
vehicle where that vehicle may be 
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forfeited to the state. 
State v. Shimits. 461 N.E.2d 1278, 1281 (Ohio 1984). 
The State, seeking a forfeiture under Section 58-37-13, 
Utah Code, is not taking by endorsement of title by one of 
the record title holders and is bound by the provision of the 
forfeiture law that protects an owner without reference to 
how the ownership is shown on the registration or certificate 
of title. The wife, having established by uncontested 
affidavits that she was the actual and equitable sole owner 
and that any use of the automobile to facilitate possession 
of marijuana was without her knowledge or consent, es-
tablished that the Mustang could not be forfeited and that 
she was entitled to its return. 
C. Assuming that the wife and husband 
were co-owners, the wife is still 
protected against forfeiture as an 
innocent owner. 
While appellant contends that she is the sole owner, she 
would still be protected if she were a co-owner with her 
husband and for purposes of this argument that will be 
assumed. The statutory protection given to innocent owners 
is not limited to sole owners and, for the reasons given in 
the immediate preceding discussion, is not defeated by making 
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an analogy between forfeiture and a conveyance under the 
Motor Vehicle Code. 
While there are no Utah appellate cases directly on 
point, the majority of other state courts addressing the 
issue of the statutory rights of an innocent owner where a 
co-owner is guilty have either returned the vehicle or 
ordered the innocent owner protected to the extent of her 
interest• The Arizona Court of Appeals in In the Matter of 
1979 Dodge Van. 721 P.2d 683 (1986), affirmed the lower 
court's order to return a van to an innocent wife whose co-
owner husband was caught driving the vehicle with marijuana 
in it under a statute which protected a claimant who could 
prove that "the claimant is the lawful owner . . . " and that 
the unlawful act was without consent of the claimant. 
The New Mexico Court of Appeals in In re Forfeiture of 
One 1970 Ford, 823 P.2d 339 (1991), interpreting a statute 
that is virtually identical to the Utah statute,6 concluded 
that the protected "owner" included a joint-owner whose co-
6The New Mexico statute provides: "no conveyance is subject 
to forfeiture under this section by reason of any act or 
omission established for (sic.) the owner to have been 
committed or omitted without his knowledge or consent." 823 
P. 2d at 340. The Utah statute provides: "a conveyance may 
not be forfeited under this section by reason of any act or 
omission committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge 
or consent." Section 58-37-13(1)(e)(ii). 
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owner son used their truck to transport marijuana for sale. 
The court noted that forfeiture provisions are not favored at 
law and are strictly construed against forfeiture. 823 P.2d 
at 341. Accord, Russell v. Park City Utah Corp. , 548 P.2d 
889, 891 (Utah 1976). The court however determined that the 
state was entitled to forfeit the son's interest and remanded 
with instructions to the lower court to use its equitable 
powers to protect both the mother's and the state's inter-
ests. 
The Supreme Court of Nevada also construed a statute, 
identical to the New Mexico statute7 and virtually identical 
to the Utah statute, as protecting the interest of a wife, 
whose husband had used their jointly owned vehicle in a drug 
transaction without her consent, specifically rejecting the 
lower court's theory that "consent (to the illegal use) is 
inherent in the nature of co-ownership." One 1978 Chevrolet 
Van v. County of Churchill. 634 P.2d 1208, 1209 (1981). 
The Michigan Court of Appeals in In re Forfeiture of 
$53.00, 444 N.W.2d 182 (1989), construed a statute, identical 
to those of New Mexico and Nevada and virtually identical to 
Utah's,8 as protecting an innocent mother to the extent of 
^ See Note 6, supra. 
8
 See Note 6, supra. 
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her interest in a car jointly owned with her guilty son who 
used it to transport narcotics. In so doing, the court 
reversed its earlier position in People v. One 1979 Honda 
Automobile. 362 N.W.2d 860 (1984), which was relied upon by 
the State of Utah in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment furnished to the circuit court in this case 
(R-52) to support its contention that the guilty knowledge of 
one joint owner was sufficient to provide a basis for 
forfeiture of the innocent wife's interest. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado held in People v. Garner, 
732 P.2d 1194 (1987), that while the guilty co-owner's 
interest in a vehicle used to transport and distribute 
illegal drugs was forfeitable, the interest of his ex-wife, 
who was an innocent co-owner, was entitled to protection 
under a mitigating provision of the statute which provided 
protection where the court finds that: 
the possession of said property is 
not unlawful and the owner of said 
property was not a party to the creation 
of the nuisance and would suffer undue 
hardship by sale, confiscation or 
destruction of the property. 
Section 16-13-308, 8A C.R.S. (1986), as quoted by the court, 
732 P.2d at 1196. 
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The Appellate Court of Illinois in People v. Wiebler, 
468 N.E.2d 1007 (1984), affirmed the denial of a petition for 
forfeiture where the state stipulated that a father did not 
have knowledge of the criminal use of a vehicle by his son 
who was a co-owner. The court described the statutory 
scheme, as follows: 
At the hearing on forfeiture, the 
State must show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the vehicle was used in the 
commission of an offense covered by the 
statute. Under section 3 6-2, the owner 
of the vehicle or any person whose right, 
title or interest is of record may then 
show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that he "did not know, and did not have 
reason to know" that the vehicle was to 
be used in the commission of the relevant 
offense. 111.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 
36-2. 
468 N.E.2d at 1008. The state argued that, since the father 
and son were "joint owners," the son's knowledge of the 
illegal conduct was sufficient for forfeiture. However, the 
court held that the father was an innocent owner who could 
defeat the forfeiture of the vehicle altogether. 
The Maryland Supreme Court in State v. One 1984 Toyota 
Truck, 533 A.2d 659 (1987), construed an innocent owner 
provision that provided: 
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No conveyance shall be forfeited 
under the provision of this section to 
the extent of the interest of any owner 
of the conveyance who neither knew nor 
should have known that the conveyance was 
used or was to be used in violation of 
this subtitle. 
533 A.2d at 663. That court held that an innocent wife was 
entitled to the return of a vehicle owned with her husband as 
tenants by the entirety and used by the husband to transport 
and distribute controlled substances. While the statute only 
provided protection "to the extent of the interest" of the 
innocent owner, the court held that, because the wife's 
interest was to the entire vehicle, the vehicle could not be 
forfeited. 533 A.2d at 667. 
D. The appropriate relief for the 
innocent wife in the circumstances of 
this case is to order release of the 
property. 
As noted in the discussion of each of the cases in the 
preceding section, while all of them protected the innocent 
co-owner, the extent of the relief varied. Some courts, 
having found an innocent co-owner, concluded that forfeiture 
was precluded. E.g., People v. Wiebler, 468 N.E.2d 1007 
(111. App. 3 Dist. 1984) ; Other courts permitted forfeiture 
of the guilty party's interest but protected the innocent 
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party to the extent of her interest. E.g. , In re Forfeiture 
of $53.00, 444 N.W.2d 182, 188-189 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); 
People v. Garner, 732 P.2d 1194, 1198-1199 (Colo. 1987). 
The Utah statute in the subsection protecting innocent 
security interests, Section 58-37-13(1)(e)(iii), provides for 
forfeiture "subject to the interest of a secured party." 
(Emphasis added). However, in the subsection protecting an 
innocent owner, Section 58-37-13(1)(e)(ii) , the statute 
provides: 
a conveyance may not be forfeited 
under this section by reason of any act 
or omission committed or omitted without 
the owner's knowledge or consent; . . . 
(Emphasis added). This language supports the contention that 
the establishment of an innocent owner simply precludes 
forfeiture altogether rather than providing for forfeiture 
subject to the interest of the innocent owner. 
However, in the circumstances of this case either inter-
pretation entitles the innocent wife to the return of the 
Mustang because the "extent of her interest" happens to be 
the entire automobile. As argued in Section II B, pages 17-
22, supra, the undisputed facts supported by affidavit were 
that the wife was the equitable sole owner of the Mustang 
having the right of possession and the husband was merely a 
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nominal co-owner on the registration. There is nothing in 
the record, even the fact of registration in the alternative, 
that suggests the wife had only a partial interest in the 
Mustang. Therefore, even if the state were to acquire the 
husband's interest by forfeiture it would acquire no property 
interest as against the wife. 
This matter is more than a little complicated by the 
fact that the husband was not a party to the proceedings 
below and the State has not, to counsel's knowledge, sought 
to forfeit his interest, such as it may be. Since the 
husband has been convicted of possession of marijuana, the 
double jeopardy provision of the United States Constitution 
could preclude forfeiture of his interest because forfeiture 
cannot fairly be characterized as remedial. See, United 
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 433, 109 S.Ct. 1892 (1989). The 
husband also could raise the prohibition against excessive 
fines contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution according to the recent Supreme Court decision 
of Austin v. United States, U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 2801 
(1993). If affirmed, the court below's interpretation of the 
innocent owner protection could lead to the absurd result of 
the innocent owner's interest being forfeited while the 
guilty co-owner's interest is not. 
29 
III. FORFEITURE IS PRECLUDED BY CONSTITU-
TIONAL AND STATUTORY VIOLATIONS IN THE 
SEIZURES. 
A. The initial seizure of the vehicle 
was the result of search and seizure in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 to the Utah Constitution. 
The subject Mustang was seized for forfeiture incident 
to the arrest of appellant's husband presumably for the 
possession of marijuana. Affidavit (of Detective Harper) in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R-57). The claimed 
justification for the detention of the husband (and conse-
quently the initial seizure of the wife's Mustang that he was 
driving) was a warrant for the search of the husband's 
person. Ibid. 
Because there was no record whatsoever in the court that 
allegedly issued the warrant of the issuance or return of the 
purported search warrant, the counsel for appellant com-
plained in the Verified Petition filed on September 28, 1993, 
twenty-six days after the raid, that he was unable to 
determine if the warrant was validly issued and therefore 
asserted it was not. (R -2). Almost two months later, as of 
November 23, 1993, the clerk was still reporting that there 
was nothing on file with regard to a search warrant for the 
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residence or the person of the husband and the appellant so 
informed the court below in the Memorandum in Opposition to 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of 
Petitioner's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (R-68). In 
that submission, the appellant wife made the following 
argument: (R-69-69) 
The Utah Search Warrant Statute, Section 77-23-4, Utah 
Code, requires a record be kept of the testimony providing 
probable cause. Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-23-7, 
requires that the serving officers "shall promptly make a 
verified return of the warrant to the magistrate." Apparent-
ly, neither was done. The obvious purpose of these statutes 
is to provide a method for persons affected to test the 
validity of the warrant and to determine the status of 
property seized. (The Utah Supreme Court has held a warrant 
invalid where the testimony showing probable cause was not 
reduced to writing. State v. Jasso, 21 Utah 2d 24, 439 P. 2d 
844 (Utah 1968). Whether the testimony was so reduced in 
this case is unknown but certainly it was not made a part of 
the court record which is the purpose of taking it in 
writing). 
It is submitted that the gross deviation from the 
statutory procedure which occurred in this case deprived the 
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appellant of her right to be secure from unreasonable and 
warrantless seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of 
the Constitution of Utah. The obvious remedy is to deprive 
the state of the presumed validity of a seizure and search 
pursuant to a warrant where there is no court record of the 
issuance of the warrant or of a return over eighty days after 
the seizure. 
Accordingly, the seizure and search of the husband 
(which resulted in the original seizure of the wife's 
automobile) and the fruits of that search should be held in 
violation of the wife's aforementioned constitutional rights. 
Forfeiture may not be predicated on evidence seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment (and by parallel reasoning, 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.) See, One 
1958 Plymouth Automobile Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 
85 S Ct. 1246 (1965). 
In the court below, the state did not belatedly file the 
missing documents or offer any explanation for the lack of 
any record of the claimed warrant. The court below in the 
Order Granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (R-
98, Appendix ii) concluded that the seizure of the vehicle 
was not illegal but did not specifically address the forego— 
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ing argument. 
B. Because the vehicle was seized 
without process directed to the vehicle 
the court below lacked jurisdiction to 
forfeit regardless of whether the 
detention, search and arrest were valid. 
In Davis v. State, 813 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1991), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the forfeiture statute required that 
the seizure must be pursuant to a seizure warrant subject to 
four exceptions, and: 
Implicit in all the exceptions to 
the requirement of a warrant is the 
principle that the seizure must be 
pursuant to some kind of process directed 
to the property (i.e., not just an arrest 
warrant) or required by exigent cir-
cumstances . 
813 P.2d at 1181-82. In Davis, the vehicle had been used to 
drive to a location where drugs were purchased and divided up 
between suspects and the undercover officer within the 
vehicle. Later an arrest warrant was obtained, the vehicle's 
owners arrested and the vehicle seized for forfeiture 
incident to the arrest. Because there was no "process 
directed to the property" or exigent circumstances justifying 
a warrantless seizure, the Utah Supreme Court found the 
seizure invalid which in turn deprived the district court of 
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jurisdiction to order the forfeiture. Ibid, at 1184.y 
In the instant case, while there might have been a 
search warrant directed at the home and person of Leon 
Howard, there clearly was no process "directed to the 
property," specifically, the Mustang automobile. Even if the 
search and arrest of Leon Howard were valid and the search of 
the automobile were valid (although it yielded nothing) as 
incident to the arrest, there was no justification for the 
forfeiture seizure of the automobile without process. 
The court below concluded at (R-99, Appendix ii): 
Additionally, the exigent cir-
cumstances of a car that at the moment 
could have been immediately moved, had 
been being moved, could be secreted by 
another party or readily transferred 
because of its joint ownership provided 
further basis for the seizure. 
However, the undisputed facts were that the Mustang was 
blocked in the driveway of appellant's home by a police car. 
(R-77). There was no reason given by the officer explaining 
why a warrant authorizing the seizure of the Mustang was not 
obtained by telephone or otherwise while the police were in 
9See also State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, (Utah 1990) 
(Plurality opinion), wherein the court limited the exceptions 
to the warrant requirements of Article I, Section 14 of the 
State Constitution as they pertained to an unintended vehicle 
on a public street to actual exigent circumstances. 
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full control of the property and the errant husband was under 
arrest. The court gives no reason why it concluded that the 
wife would be inclined to spirit the vehicle into hiding or 
sell it before the officers could get process even if that 
had been possible. There must be some evidence other than 
the obvious mobility of an automobile to conclude that it 
will be removed from the jurisdiction. See, State v. Will, 
672 P.2d 1316 (Ariz. 1983). The Utah Supreme Court when 
applying Utah law has not followed the federal "automobile 
exception" which excuses a warrant simply because an automob-
ile is involved and is mobile. See, State v. Larocco, 794 
P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), (Plurality opinion); Davis v. State, 
813 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1991). 
No legal process was sought by the law enforcement 
officers prior to the forfeiture seizure which occurred on 
September 2, 1993 or even after the fact. No magistrate 
reviewed the matter, even ex parte, until appellant's 
petition for return of property was reviewed on the cross-
motions for summary judgment sometime after November 30, 
1993. For over three months, the appellant was deprived of 
her vehicle based upon the unreviewed conclusion that it was 
forfeitable made by a peace officer whose agency had an 
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interest in acquiring the vehicle for its own use.10 The 
decision to seize property here was not only not made by a 
"disinterested magistrate," it was not even made by a 
disinterested police officer. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Since none of the underlying facts were in dispute and a 
proper application of the law to those facts leads to the 
legal conclusion that the wife, Norma Howard, was entitled to 
the return of her car, appellant requests that this court 
reverse the Order of the circuit court and remand the matter 
with instructions to issue an order returning the subject 
vehicle to Norma Howard. In the alternative, Appellant 
requests this court to reverse and remand with instructions 
to the Circuit Court to hold a hearing, within twenty days as 
Section 58-37-13(9)(e), Utah Code, requires, to resolve any 
factual matters this court determines to be unresolved. 
10The state's Answer to the Petition requested as relief 
that the property be awarded to the seizing agency. 
Paragraph 6 of the affirmative allegations states that the 
agency "is able to use the vehicle as an undercover vehicle." 
(R-45). 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of February, 
1994. 
5HN D. O'COSNELL 
attorney for 
Petitioner/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this £k day of February, 
1994, I mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the BRIEF 
OF APPELLANT to RENA BARBIERO, Deputy County Attorney, 2001 
South State Street, #S3400, Salt Lake City* Utah-^84130-1200. 
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APPENDIX 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
NORMA HOWARD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SIATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 930011027 
FACTS 
No material issues of fact are in dispute. Respondent 
seized a jointly owned vehicle pursuant to the arrest of the 
driver who was in possession of marijuana. Petitioner is the 
other joint owner of the vehicle. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Utah Code Annotated 58 -37-13 (1) (e) requires the seized 
vehicle to be "used or intended for use, to transport and or in 
any manner facilitate sale, receipt, simple possession, or 
concealment" of a controlled substance. From the plain wording 
of the statutory language the legislative intent is to forfeit 
vehicles used in any manner in connection with controlled 
substances. 
In this case the Mustang was being backed out of the 
defendant's driveway while Mr. Howard, the defendant, concealed 
the marijuana. Such action appears to have been intended by the 
legislature to be subject to forfeiture. As Petitioner correctly 
points out, the statute does not provide for forfeiture of the 
vehicle merely because marijuana was in proximity to it. But 
this car was not parked next to marijuana. The Defendant 
possessing marijuana was not standing next to the car. The issue 
is not proximity. Rather it is as the legislature addressed, use 
in any manner. Defendant was inside the car with the marijuana, 
backing the car out of his driveway. Consequently the car was 
used in a manner that facilitated the possession and is therefore 
subject to forfeiture. 
2. Petitioner owns the vehicle jointly with the criminal 
defendant. She knew the Defendant used drugs but didn't consent 
to his use of the vehicle in violation of the drug laws. Were 
Petitioner the sole owner of the vehicle she could assert an 
innocent owner's interest with persuasiveness. Here, however, 
the nature of the ownership is joint and the guilty knowledge of 
the defendant is a sufficient basis for forfeiture. Further, 
even if Petitioner could assert an innocent owner's interest, she 
does not argue that the car was either moved without her consent 
or that she did what she reasonably could to prevent the illegal 
use of the < ar by the defendant. Under federal cise law only 
these two circumstances would support her assertion against 
forfeiture. 
3. Finally, the seizure of the vehicle in this case was 
not illegal. Respondent's answer asserts that the vehicle was 
seized incident to an arrest and pursuant to 58-37-13 Utah Code 
*) ^l#? Annpnrliy i i 
Annotated. Under Davis v State 813 p2d 1178, (1991), warrantless 
seizure of property is subject to forfeiture, among other 
exceptions, where the seizure is incident to arrest. 
Additionally, the exigent circumstances of a car that at the 
moment could have been immediately moved, had been being moved, 
could be secreted by another party or readily trcxnsferred because 
of its joint ownership provided further basis for the seizure. 
ORDER 
Accordingly, Petitioner's motion for summary judgment is 
denied and Respondent's motion for summary judgment granted. 
Dated this ^ day of December, 1993. 
"^"Circuit Court Judge 
Sheila K. McCleve 
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